

On the Dualism or the Two Ingredients of the Divine

Tapering
to a point, conserving everything,
this carrot is predestined to be thick.
The world is
but a circumstance, a mis-
erable corn-patch for its feet.

Marianne Moore, “Radical” in *Observations*

I The friend of the author of *Socrates and Aristophanes* [SA stands for this book¹ in the following for convenience], Jacob Klein, writes in his review: “Wealth (Plutos) and Peace (Eirene), in the plays which bear their names, ‘are each severally divinity itself’ inasmuch as they embody the two ingredients of the divine (SA 306): Eirene is a beautiful statue (which is insensitive to pain); Plutos ‘is in need of man, of human help, in order to come into his own or to be himself.’ (SA 296)” It finally leads to “if perhaps the most important” result of Leo Strauss’ interpretation of Aristophanes which is about the condition of the recognition of a god.² Klein’s expression regarding Plutos’ divinity is rather curious for the emphasis is not put on Plutos’ helpfulness *for* human but its *need of* human help. And we can say that the need of human help is not exclusively a trait of Plutos because Eirene shares it as well.³ As a result, rather than a difference, this ingredient is more a commonality for both Eirene and Plutos.⁴ While Klein puts his emphasis on “being helped” according to page 296⁵, Strauss speaks of that ingredient of the divine in a rather positive

1. Leo Strauss, *Socrates and Aristophanes* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966).

2. Jacob Klein, *The Massachusetts Review* 9, no. 2 (1968): 399–400, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25087721>.

3. For both Plutos and Eirene, this so-called “need of human help” is not undoubtedly because they are not searching for help in the first place: both “helps” are initiated by human beings.

4. The similarity between the *Peace* and the *Wealth* is also proved by their openings: slave complaining the abnormal master. SA 283.

5. SA 296: “Plutos, we may say, differs from all other gods because he alone is helpfulness itself, goodness that can not help communicating itself universally. This is not to deny that in contradistinction to the other gods, he is in need of man, of human help, in order to come into his own or to be himself. In a way he is divinity itself — that which makes a god a god.”

way: “[Plutos] becomes necessarily and universally helpful by taking the place hitherto occupied by the arts, nomos, and chance, or by being as it were the unity of the arts, nomos and chance.” And this ingredient of the divine of which the comical equivalent is Plutos rather than Eirene has an undefeated opposite — Athena *pammachos* (SA 306). Strauss’ expression here is also curious for he seems to deliberately pick Plutos instead of Eirene to be the “enemy” of the virgin warrior. What is significant about that choice? What is the relationship between Plutos and Eirene? And is that safe to say the opposite of one ingredient of the divine is nothing but another ingredient of it since Athena is a god in the end? The third question might find its clue in the conclusion where Strauss mentions “the two ingredients” by himself: “there is a connection between the dualism of the two ingredients of the divine and such dualisms as those of Love and Hatred or of Motion and Rest.” (SA 313) Nonetheless, we need to take an analytical and synthetical investigation into those characters by Aristophanes and Strauss’ treatment of them in order to attempt more detailed responses to out questions regarding this intricate fabric of divine personalities. This analysis will start with Eirene in the *Peace*.

II With the help of Hermes — whose artisan’s competence is asked for providing guidance on the excavation (SA 146; *Peace* 426-39) — Eirene is liberated by the peace lover. Strauss asks us to notice the difference between the arts and agriculture based on the reaction of the audience portrayed by Aristophanes: the whole of artisans is less coherent regarding peace than the whole of farmers.⁶ He also distinguished disinterring Peace as a work (which makes peace possible) from the works of peace proper (which is made possible by peace). (SA 148) Only in the former case peace is an end-in-itself — which is probably not the final end though. Then he makes us aware of the abstraction of any other goddess or god especially Demeter in the praise of the chorus composed of “men of standing and farmers” (*Peace* 556). It is clear that without Demeter a good agriculture is not possible. In a narrow sense of the word “peace”, Eirene is more or less artificial for she is the subject of “the comic equivalent of the conclusion of the peace treaty” (SA 143). We should say that Chance is also a decisive factor of agriculture which should not be disregarded in addition to peace if peace is not already an aspect of Chance/Nature.

III It seems like once Eirene is excavated peace is restored immediately (*Peace* 550–554: “Let the farmer take their farming tools and return to their fields *as quickly as possible*...”). There is no need for any extra deed or speech besides bringing her back to Greece: there is no resistance in peace — is peace itself simply an ease? This might explain Klein’s emphasis on Eirene being “insensitive to pain” since sympathy is inspired by difficulty. The leader of the chorus nevertheless slows their joyful homecoming by asking Hermes⁷ a question

6. In his interpretation of the obscurity of the chorus, Strauss addresses this distinction again: “The obscurity reveals, while concealing it, the difference between farmers and artisans or a certain kind of artisans.” SA 149.

7. He is not asking Eirene herself. There is a certain deterrent character in her.

regarding Eirene's travel history, in other words, indulging in his curiosity which could have led to a sacrilegious situation (SA 148). Hermes' account builds a connection between Eirene's agony and the exile of Phidias, an artisan who was famous as a maker of beautiful statues and was imprisoned for a case related to the making of Athena⁸. This connection is accepted by the leader of the chorus for it explains Eirene's Beauty (if the difference between natural beauty and artificial beauty could be suspended)⁹. Despite some reasonable reserve ("As far as we could observe hitherto..."), Strauss speaks with confidence that Eirene is a statue. Could we say it is Strauss' very bold expression that dramatizes the hidden artificiality of Eirene? Strauss then makes two statements: 1) Beautiful and philanthropic divinities are the work of artisans; 2) beautiful and philanthropic divinities are female. Does that imply a relationship between femininity and the making of artisans (which is distinguished from being made by farmers)? The following bracketed statement is also curious: "(Just as Polemos is less terrible than war itself, Eirene is more beautiful than peace itself.)" (SA 150) Since Eirene is in the end portrayed by the artist Aristophanes, can we say the extra beauty (if not all beauty) of her is nothing but Aristophanes' art?

IV Trygaios notices the awkward silence of Eirene and "raises in effect the question of the manner of being of this exemplary divinity." (SA 151) Hermes blames the audience who is supposedly a mix of Athenian farmers and artisans who have made Eirene suffer for her silence. Strauss is not convinced by Hermes' reason: "If she was as angry with the Greeks as the other gods, why was it necessary for Polemos to enter her? Polemos' action seems rather to prove what is hardly in need of proof, that Eirene can not be angry, just as it seems to prove that Eirene can move under her own power. Be this as it may..." (SA 151) This might be a sarcasm on Polemos' stupidity for being unable to recognize the absolute indifference of Eirene. But if Polemos is not stupid, then his action can only be read as his foresight spiced with the divine malice thus behaves unjustly from the perspective of human peace lovers: he is not preventing Eirene from escaping but human beings from rescuing on purpose. Not interestingly though, we will find out that the only people who would bother to rescue Eirene will have a nature that is very different from hers but similar to Polemos: if Trygaios is absolutely peaceful, he will not appeal to the gods in the first place. Be this as it may, Eirene's general ableness might still be proved by being a vehicle as a replacement of the dung beetle for Trygaios' descension, if being rode does not overshadow her being able to move under her own power. Her ableness of talking by herself, however, remains unclear: her ability to the dialectical, in another word, philosophy, does not seem to exist.¹⁰

8. Plutarch, *Pericles*, Chapter 31.

9. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgment*, §45: "Nature is beautiful because it looks like Art; and Art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as Art while yet it looks like Nature."

10. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 139: "Thought is primarily trespass and violence, the enemy, and nothing presupposes philosophy: everything begins with misosophy."

V For Trygaios himself, peace is more than a *restitutio in integrum*. He gets Eirene’s companion Opora as his new wife (this marriage was planned by Hermes) and is “made young by love” according to the envious chorus (SA 152; *Peace* 859). To some extent, Strauss’ comment proves our previous guessing (paragraph IV) on the relationship between Eirene and Trygaios-Aristophanes¹¹: “Peace does not beautify everybody; peace is in need of beautification: hence Eirene the goddess. In Trygaios’ view it is only fair that he be treated differently from everybody else: He was the one who by his journey on the back of the beetle saved the Greeks. Only the beautifier deserves beautification.” (SA 154) A problem remains: Does peace even beautify anybody? Since the whole deed of the rescue of Eirene is Trygaios’ (SA 146), in other words, the making of the *Peace* is Aristophanes’, it is more proper to say Trygaios-Aristophanes is the self-beautifier solely: “only the beautifier deserves beautification.” It is clear that beauty is hardly an intrinsic character of Eirene. If being beautiful could still remain an ingredient of the divine, we are almost going to say Aristophanes is the ingredient.¹² But let us turn to Plutos in the *Wealth* for a moment.

VI Plutos seems to be less a statue than Eirene. His mobility is effective if not easily visible (for no one could recognize him). He is partially hindered by being blinded compared to Eirene’s full imprisonment: is he a less serious case for Zeus? His rudeness (*Wealth* 55-63) and cowardice (*Wealth* 70-75 and 115-125) might be caused by his disabled by Zeus if they are not in his nature. It is not uninteresting to think about Zeus’ action and intention for a moment. Based on the premise of “wealth corrupts absolutely” (SA 285), if we think Zeus is just (he wants to make people noble by distributing no wealth), his blinding of Plutos is ill-reasoned for the perfect solution for universal justice is to treat Plutos by the same way he treats Eirene: corruption brought by wealth will be eradicated once and for all (if we don’t question why the corruption of wealth is even made possible by Zeus in the first place). As a result, if the premise is true, Zeus can not be wise when he is just and vice versa. Nay, the “vice versa” — Zeus can not be just when he is wise — is not feasible. A wise entity should be able to eliminate chance (of failing one’s own intention) if eliminating uncertainty is not already a definition of being wise. This is the standard of our judgment of wisdom. As a result, the choice a wise Zeus should make is of imprisoning Plutos or not and no matter which one he chooses there will be no chance involved then we can judge his morality according to the premise which implies another standard that is the one of our judgement of morality. He chooses to blind Plutos, however, which is the reason to think he is unwise

11. For the relationship between Trygaios and Aristophanes, see SA 152-153.

12. Cf. SA 245: “This could be thought to imply that only gods can know whether a given being is or is not a god, or that human beings as such can not know gods; *deus est quem dei deum esse declarant.*” and SA 291 with Strauss himself stating “Penia acts unjustly, regardless of whether she is a human being or a super-human being; an action benefiting all human beings (or all human beings except one) but injurious to gods is just. If a god acts as an enemy of the human race, he is justly treated as an enemy.”

for gambling does not seem to be a wise activity. Moreover, if “wealth corrupts accidentally”¹³ (which means the rather distant outcome of the distribution — moral corruption or not — might not be Zeus’ responsibility so that we can only judge him by his distribution of wealth itself while in the former case Zeus is judged by the moral outcome of his distribution¹⁴) and we think Zeus is unjust (he wants to disappoint the worthy by distributing nothing not to mention misery), his jealousy towards the worthy is also not executed well for he does not completely reverse the suggested just distribution but only randomizes it: some people would still get what they deserve. As a result, considering our negation of the original premise, Zeus can not be wise when he is unjust. To sum up our speculation, Zeus is not wise regardless of his morality. However, to make it clear, “being wise” here is portrayed as actualizing one’s own intention by eliminating the chance of failure when there is a certain mode to act. We should not forget a possibility of being wise, or even being just, when there is no existing standard (certainty)¹⁵.

VII Now we shall come back to Plutos. Despite his rudeness and cowardice, he is willing/persuaded to change. Nature is not unchangeable (eyes can be blinded; cowardice can be overcome). This desire to change is challenged by Penia. Penia’s argument is well-reasoned: wealth is due to human work which is driven by scarcity — herself, which is not questioned by the human helper of Plutos. But she is still repulsive. Stauss makes it clear that the failure of Penia is rooted in her philosophical inability of questioning the premise of the play, in other words, the impossibility of Plutos: “the impossibility on which the Plutos is based is the fact that Plutos is both wealth pure and simple, a quality or appurtenance of human beings, and a god, a self-subsisting being, or, if you wish, a being that literally talks.” (SA 286) “...wealth is a god whose mere staying with a man makes that man wealthy, or that there is a god Plutos who does not need Penia as his basis, so that his restoration to his pristine state coincides with the complete disappearance of Penia. Her reasonable thesis is rendered

13. The negation of the original premise if “wealth corrupts accidentally” instead of “wealth does not corrupt”. The former involves chance thus it is the latter that is closer to the original premise.

14. In the second case (which is the one with more sense of reality), the new premise “wealth corrupts accidentally” is rather unclear which disables itself to be a standard. Nevertheless, the standard of the judgement of morality provided by the original premise is implicitly replaced by another standard: the immediate gain. As a result the only just distribution according to that standard would be the existence of Plutos if he indeed has the absolute sight which is nothing but an equivalent of the absolute wisdom — the understanding of human beings. (But what does he see exactly? Action of people? Or intention which is said to be psychological and can be separated from the former?) The opposite of this distribution is a universal evil targeting everybody, which is clearly not the case with Zeus. Zeus is Plutos’ political enemy (SA 285) as well as the philosophical antithesis of “universal helpfulness” (which is only possible when there is not a single person who needs help to negate others’ needs) — not universal malice but particular malice. And if a new (which might mean unknown) standard of the judgment of morality revenges on the standard of the immediate gain (“wealth corrupts accidentally” does not exclude “wealth elevates accordingly yet implicitly”), a wise and just Zeus would be imaginable again if a god is still needed.

15. See footnote 14

manifestly absurd by the mere existence of Plutos” (SA 296) It seems like Strauss is suggesting a sound philosophy is able to be the final winner. Nevertheless, the task for Penia is for sure to question the impossibility of divinity itself — “universal and necessary helpfulness”, if the “impossibility as divinity” itself is not possible. I will try to structure this question differently by proving Plutos, in addition to being impossible, is defective — due to this defectiveness the adverbial in the claim: “Zeus does not *even* exist” is more than necessary. Let’s be clear, this expression — “universal and necessary” — is not meant by this Aristophanian Plutos exactly, we are at most to say he is “necessary” thus “just” helpfulness since “universal” helpfulness should not exclude anyone including the unjust — which is not the case of the *Wealth*. Yet if we do desire that “universal and necessary” helpfulness, then how would that be actualized? In footnote 14, one condition of this proposition was discussed: it can be true only if there is no one asking for a help intentionally contradicting the content of another help asked by other people. If we accept that condition, we still need a more specific explanation: what exactly is a help (again, a word picked by not Aristophanes but Strauss¹⁶)? It can be said to be an action that actualizes the helpee’s intention which cannot be (or has not been) actualized by this helpee. And people generally intend happiness not to mention the actualization of an intention itself (even if what is intended is Asceticism) might be happiness anyway: the actualization of an intention is the means (if not the content) of happiness. However, if happiness is the ultimate goal, and we are free to abstract happiness from anything to which it attaches and make it into a god, then is a helper-god not inefficient? If we can have happiness pure and simple, then why do we need wealth (not to mention help) pure and simple? Plutos would be reasonably kicked out, like Penia, when another god representing universal and necessary happiness comes into being. This god makes all human beings happy immediately and does not even depend on that condition which denies Plutos’ existence in the very beginning since it is happiness without content¹⁷.

VIII We should also notice the element of agriculture is not prominent in the *Wealth* as it seems. In the *Peace*, farmer at least contribute all the labor of excavation and we remember Trygaios asks them to return to their fields afterwards. In the *Wealth*, farmers’ task is nothing but come to receive the just redistribution and their future labor is also waived for their historical hardworking/justice: Demeter this time is certainly out of business if we can say in the *Peace* her relevance is neglected but not cancelled. We might wonder for farmers what is the difference between Demeter and Plutos. Demeter should

16. Strauss also mentions “universal happiness” once on page 291 of SA, but “helpfulness” is used for Plutos predominantly. The difference is explained in this paragraph.

17. Cf. Leo Strauss, *On Plato’s Symposium* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 200: “Happiness seems to be an answer which does not need any further question. It seems to be the end of man. We have here an example of what right opinion is. It is right opinion; it is not knowledge, for ‘it seems’. It is not knowledge because it leaves unclear what happiness consists in. Men divine that they seek happiness, and they have a general understanding of what it is and we can crudely say, Happiness if a state of contentedness, you want nothing further...”

be enough for farmers if they only expect that their labor will always pay off, in other words, the absence of bad harvests due to any external cause — which might be regarded as the naive farming justice¹⁸: they do not expect reaping without sowing [Galatians 6:7], which means farming itself, or arts [in general], is kept by themselves). If Plutos is the unity thus replacement of arts, nomos and chance, then Demeter will be the replacement of chance which is already rather effective. But why is Plutos more exciting? The only thing left is nomos. Farmers also want nomos. But for what? Aristophanes' *Wasps* tells us they want nomos for judging people's morality. Farmers might be able to live on their own (SA 288)¹⁹ but can not help caring other people. They have waspishness as their nature. In this sense, they are not different from the sycophant — the one who regards farmers as fools (*Peace* 903): they are busybodies too. Moreover, the chance replaced by Demeter is not as same as the chance replaced by Plutos. Metaphorically speaking, the former is about justice under law while the latter is about justice without law which points again to the impossibility of this replacement.²⁰

IX Strauss' treatment of Eros in the *Wealth* deserves special attention for it has an appearance of contradiction. On the one hand, an end is put to the perversion of eros through wealth or law so that “eros comes into its own” and the natural order is restored (SA 302). On the other hand, “In the *Plutos* eros is disregarded and at most only alluded to by the presence of the hag, the only character in the play who swears by Aphrodite.” (SA 305) We can think that there are two kinds of eros. Eros is the romantic love in the former while the love of wisdom²¹ in the latter. Yet this distinction by itself is not satisfactory. In the case of the hag, the so-called “eros liberated” can only be true from the perspective of the youth. The fact that the hag still loves the youth proves first the existence of her eros and second its servitude to “nature”: the servitude can not be rid of but only change its direction. If we accept Diotima's formula, compared with the youth's new relationship (beautiful couple), it is the hag as the Poverty of beauty that is going to deliver the legitimate child — Eros — with the youth as the Wealth of beauty. But if physical affluence is no longer a factor (if we understand Plutos in its literal sense and be faithful to the plot) and her age and physical beauty are hardly adjustable, but she does not want to give up and would not like to do anything risking sexual harassment, what can she do?

18. This is also what they learn from farming experience: labor gets pay off. This empirical observation regarding crops evolves into a moral speculation regarding crops and the latter will finally evolve into a moral speculation regarding nature including human beings. Cf. Strauss comments on farming, diligence and knowledge in Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse* (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 1998), 180–181 and 207–209.

19. “Farmers are generally loved and respected because they are supposed to be just, since they live from their work and not on others.” Can we say that dependence on human beings is the distinction between farmer-makers and artisan-makers or certain kinds of artisan-makers?

20. I do not have a good reason for this thought for now. Demeter is close to meteorology plus agricultural technology which resembles justice as law-abidingness (science/machine-like). The chance targeted by meteorology should be different from the chance targeted by ethics.

21. “...there is no place in [the order of Plutos] for the vulgar crafts or for government, but all the more for eros and wisdom.” SA 306.

Maybe she will become a philosopher (if qualitatively different excellences are qualified to compete in a unified league of eros)! If the ugly hag reminds us of the ugly Penia, she must remind us of the ugly Socrates as well. I would say this is my comic equivalent of a becoming of philosopher since a typically Platonic notion teaches us that “what is so inconspicuous at first glance reflects, in a way more directly, the highest.”²² Plutos’ impossible or even possible²³ existence in the end, far from being preventing wisdom, ignites the very strong resistance of wisdom (we are tempted to say wisdom resists naturally) for Strauss in fact makes it clear that disregarding of eros is deduced only under the premise of the crime of eros would be successfully suppressed by the punishment of poverty (SA 305–306). We sense, however, eros has an unpalatable but undeniable relation to, if not roots in, crime, in another word, perversion.

X At the first glance, Eirene is the political condition of Plutos: Plutos is the juicy fruit of Eirene. For the growth of wealth, development of arts and life enjoyment, peace is necessary (munitioners and blood-thirsty people are excluded for now). Yet the *Peace* is literally more beautiful than the *Wealth*: Trygaeos — soon to be rejuvenated — does his miraculous deed — ascending to heaven — in front of the audience and Eirene is said to be beautiful while the only miracle — restoring Plutos’ sight — in the *Wealth* is only communicated through the mouth of a slave, and Chremylos and Plutos remain old men who just talk and walk. People still work in the *Peace* but no one needs to work as long as they “behave well” (see footnote 14) in the *Wealth*: the justice it advocates is not very sound. This might be Aristophanes’ implicit and partial disapproval of the ethics of the *Wealth*. We can go further, however, to say Eirene is even the philosophical *a posteriori* of Plutos. Since Plutos is not only ontologically impossible (SA 286) but also economically inefficient (paragraph VII.), we will make a new god — happiness pure and simple. What rests in the nature of this god is the state of “wanting nothing further”²⁴ (even not sustaining this very state) — ease pure and simple. Not till now we are finally able to attempt to understand potentially Strauss’ “most complicated sentence” in this book (according to Professor Meier): “The undefeated opposite of that ingredient of the divine, the comical equivalent of which is Plutos rather than Eirene, is Athena *pammachos*, who is celebrated at the end of the *Lysistrate*, rather than Polemos.” (SA 306) Due to his defectiveness, Plutos is comical. Eirene or “happiness pure and simple” is in the end, not certainly impossible²⁵ and probably more attractive thus can bring real danger and deep regret. By pointing out the absence of Athena, Strauss sees Aristophanes’ hidden alliance with

22. Strauss, *On Plato’s Symposium*, 241.

23. “In the end Schmitt does not regard this ideal as utopian — he concedes, be it said, that he does not know *whether its realization is possible or not* — but he abominates it.” See “Comments on *Der Begriff des Politischen* by Carl Schmitt,” in Leo Strauss, *Spinoza’s Critique of Religion* (New York: Schocken Books, 1965). This possibility will be explained further in paragraph X.

24. See footnote 17.

25. We should remember Eirene is mostly a statue, i.e., artificial, which waives her from Strauss’ attack on the impossibility of Plutos. See also paragraph II.

the female-artist (paragraph III) and warriors (SA 157: “Trygaios, the comic poet, the perfect votary of Eirene, has no pacifist illusions...”). Her “pammachos” (readiness) is the courage to say yes to the “state of nature”, which is not necessarily bellicose (thus “rather than Polemos”) but willing to relinquish “the security of the status quo”.²⁶ Beauty is certainly not exclusive to Eirene. For better or worse, the beauty of cruelty is a long-standing tradition. We might say Athena as a living god stands on one side of the dualism of the divine while the other side belongs to happiness pure and simple which sounds very much like death pure and simple. We might also say the virgin warrior is herself a dualism of the divine for it is not impossible to imagine she is ready not only to kill but also to deliver — *immaculata conceptio*.

XI We shall not disdain, however, the exoteric teaching of the author altogether. Strauss ends his book by directly referring to Muhammad b. Zakariyya al-Rāzi’s *The Philosophic Way of Life*. We might be surprised by the hedonism of this text. Strauss says yes to happiness. But what kind of happiness? It is certainly not happiness pure and simple for, if not ignoble, it is ontologically untenable (like Plutos): we can not abstract happiness from anything to which it attaches and this anything belongs to the realm of human beings where we do and be done. Then what rests in the real or rather super happiness is a different ease conserved by Nietzsche where lies the disagreement of Strauss with Schmitt.²⁷ Thanks to Strauss’ profound sight, we could see the seriousness in the explicit approval of the crude justice (SA 307)²⁸ by Aristophanes who is undoubtedly a great observer. Another philosopher, Henri Bergson, teaches “we shall disdain nothing we have seen” too, in his *Laughter*.

26. Heinrich Meier, *The Hidden Dialogue* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 39.

27. “I can point no trace of struggle in my life...I look out upon my future — a broad future! — as upon a calm sea...” See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, “Why I am so Clever,” section 9 and Deleuze’s discussion on struggle and selection in Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 82. Cf. The beginning of Wallace Stevens’ “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction”. Cf. Christopher Bruell’s very helpful collection of Strauss’ mentioning of laughter in his forward to Strauss, *Xenophon’s Socratic Discourse*.

28. Under Plutos’ reign justice is necessary only as a means for happiness brought by wealth. But this justice is only law-abidingness. It is almost certain that wisdom can also bring happiness. And if the equation “virtue=knowledge” is true, then we might say justice, not exactly law-abidingness this time, will be rejuvenated as an end-in-itself again. We should be careful, however, because the challenge to law-abidingness does come not only from making a new law but also from choosing between laws and the (ir)rationality of the former is probably mere hubris with poor quality. Cf. “Modern Moral Philosophy” in G. E. M. Anscombe, *Human Life, Action and Ethics* (Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2005).

References

- Anscombe, G. E. M. *Human Life, Action and Ethics*. Charlottesville: Imprint Academic, 2005.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- . *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
- Klein, Jacob. *The Massachusetts Review* 9, no. 2 (1968): 399–400. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25087721>.
- Meier, Heinrich. *The Hidden Dialogue*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Strauss, Leo. *On Plato's Symposium*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- . *Socrates and Aristophanes*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966.
- . *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*. New York: Schocken Books, 1965.
- . *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse*. South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 1998.